Summary

Buy, $1,085 target: the next memory downturn has a price floor under it

InitiationBy Penmark Team
MUBuy$1085.00+65%
Page 1 of 31
Equity research | Initiation of coverage | United States
Semiconductors: memory | Coverage: Initiated | Published 6 November 2026, 06:30 ET
Penmark Research Team | research@penmarkresearch.com
Micron Technology (Nasdaq: MU)

Buy, $1,085 target: the next memory downturn has a price floor under it

Rating
Initiation
Buy
12-month target
$1,085
Price, 5 Nov 26
$658.70
Price return
+64.8%
Total return
+64.9%
Bull case
$1,653
Bear case
$507

We initiate at Buy with a $1,085 target, a 64.9% total return: the price discounts $86bn of mid-cycle NOPAT, between our bear ($61bn) and base ($139bn) cases and closer to the bear.

  • The price sits closer to our bear than our base: $86bn of mid-cycle NOPAT against $61bn and $139bn. Our base needs 26 supply agreements (over 35% of revenue to 2030) to hold.
  • CY28 is tighter than CY27: we are 7.6% above consensus on FY28E revenue. $343.9bn against $319.7bn.
  • Cash arrives before the downturn: $328bn of free cash flow in FY27E-FY28E, 44% of the market value. Capex is funded internally.

What the market is missing. Price-implied mid-cycle EBIT margin is 37.5%; our base is 62.0% with floors holding, and the FY31E trough is 55%. We agree on FY27E and differ on FY29E-FY31E.

Catalysts. Q1 FY27 results in December (guide $61.5bn), Q2 FY27 in March 2027 as repriced HBM bits land, and CY28 contract talks.

Valuation and target. 6.9x mid-cycle earnings at a 15.3% WACC on $143.3bn of weighted FY29E-FY36E NOPAT, plus FY27E-FY28E cash flow and $55.4bn net cash; $918 weighted, rolled to $1,085; DCF $876.

Risks. CXMT server DDR5 brings the downturn forward (−$29 a share), NAND cleanroom space from late CY28 (−$62) and NAND prices levelling (−$26).

Exhibit 1: EPS more than doubles to $171.21 in FY27E, leaving the stock on 3.8x
US$bnFY25AFY26AFY27EFY28EFY29E
Revenue37.4133.2276.1343.9326.2
Growth y/y48.9%256.3%107.3%24.6%−5.2%
EBITDA18.1108.8240.7304.4282.9
Margin48.5%81.7%87.2%88.5%86.8%
Net income8.585.0195.3246.0225.8
EPS, non-GAAP ($)8.2975.52171.21215.36197.83
Growth y/yn/m811%127%26%−8%
Free cash flow3.762.3135.6192.7192.8
At $658.70FY25AFY26AFY27EFY28EFY29E
P/E79.5x8.7x3.8x3.1x3.3x
EV/EBITDA38.1x6.3x2.9x2.3x2.4x
P/B13.8x5.4x2.2x1.3x0.9x
FCF yield0.5%8.4%18.2%25.9%25.9%
Dividend yield0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%
ROE15.8%61.4%58.3%42.3%27.9%
Net debt / EBITDA0.2x(0.5)x(0.8)x(1.3)x(2.0)x
P/E at our $1,085 target——6.3x5.0x5.5x

Source: Company filings (A); Penmark Research estimates (E). Multiples at the 5 Nov 2026 price; EV/EBITDA uses today's EV of $689.6bn for every year; only the last row is at our target. FY25A EPS growth is not meaningful (no FY24 non-GAAP EPS). $bn except EPS ($). Negative net debt is net cash, after $12.9bn of customer contract liabilities.

Base $911, bull $1,653, bear $507: 1.7x upside to downside against a $659 price

Exhibit 3: Bull $1,653, base $911, bear $507 against a $659 price; target $1,085
$0$500$1000$1500$200020262027ActualEstimates →Price $658.70Bull $1653.04 (+151%)Base $911.39 (+38%)Bear $507.25 (−23%)

Source: Exchanges; Penmark Research estimates. Scenario values at the 3 Sep 2026 valuation date, shown at the model values with no roll-forward. The $1,085 target is the weighted $918 rolled forward at the 15.4% cost of equity to 5 Nov 2027 and is not plotted

Scenarios and price target basis
Bull$1,653+151%20% prob.

Tightness holds into CY29: HBM4E repricing keeps DRAM up 10% in FY28E, the downturn slips to FY30E; trough gross margin 73.9%, mid-cycle EBIT 74.8%.

Base$911+38%45% prob.

Tight through CY28, then a downturn as cleanroom space arrives; floors hold. FY31E trough 55% EBIT margin (62.3% gross); mid-cycle 62.0% and $138.7bn of NOPAT, against $85.8bn in the price.

Bear$507−23%35% prob.

Pricing peaks in CY27 as CXMT ships server DDR5 and floors fail; a 70% DRAM price fall to FY31E leaves a 43.8% trough gross margin, 43.9% mid-cycle EBIT and $61.4bn of NOPAT.

Probability-weighted value$918+39% vs price
Upside to downside1.7x$260 up / $152 down
Exhibit 4: Revenue doubles in FY27E, to $276bn
Income, US$bnFY25AFY26AFY27EFY28EFY29E
Revenue37.4133.2276.1343.9326.2
Gross profit15.3108.0240.4297.2268.1
EBITDA18.1108.8240.7304.4282.9
EBIT9.899.3229.3285.2255.5
Net financial items(0.4)0.21.95.911.7
Tax1.114.835.845.141.4
Net income, non-GAAP9.386.3196.9247.7227.5
Net income, reported8.585.0195.3246.0225.8
Exhibit 5: FCF reaches $136bn in FY27E after $55bn of capex
Cash flow, US$bnFY25AFY26AFY27EFY28EFY29E
EBITDA18.1108.8240.7304.4282.9
Working capital and other1.0(4.6)(16.2)(7.5)4.6
Tax and interest paid(1.6)(14.5)(33.9)(39.2)(29.7)
Operating cash flow17.589.7190.6257.7257.8
Capex, net of incentives(13.8)(27.4)(55.0)(65.0)(65.0)
Free cash flow3.762.3135.6192.7192.8
Dividends and buybacks(0.5)(1.3)(0.7)(0.7)(0.7)
Acquisitions and other—————
Exhibit 6: Net cash reaches $574bn by FY29E
Balance sheet, US$bnFY25AFY26AFY27EFY28EFY29E
Cash and investments11.973.5208.3400.3592.4
Net working capital7.020.638.648.145.7
Net PP&E46.663.3106.9152.7190.2
Goodwill and other7.311.511.511.511.5
Total assets82.8168.9365.4612.7839.8
Debt14.65.25.25.25.2
Net cash / (debt)(2.8)55.4190.3382.3574.4
Shareholders’ equity54.2138.4334.9582.1809.3
Exhibit 7: Book value per share reaches $704 by FY29E
Per share, KPIsFY25AFY26AFY27EFY28EFY29E
Diluted shares (m)1,1251,1431,1501,1501,150
EPS, non-GAAP ($)8.2975.52171.21215.36197.83
EPS, reported ($)7.5974.33169.87213.91196.31
Dividend per share ($)0.460.530.600.600.60
FCF per share ($)3.3154.52117.88167.57167.64
Book value per share ($)48.15121.06291.18506.20703.71
Non-GAAP gross margin40.9%81.1%87.1%86.4%82.2%
Capex / sales36.9%20.5%19.9%18.9%19.9%

Source: Company filings (A); Penmark Research estimates (E). Non-GAAP adds back stock compensation to cost of sales and charges it below EBIT; capex is net of government incentives.

Returns peak at 174% on capital in FY27E, and the stock still trades at 3.8x earnings

Exhibit 8: Margin peaks in FY28E at 88.5% and holds above 82% in FY29E
Growth, margins (%)FY25AFY26AFY27EFY28EFY29E
Growth y/y
Sales48.9256.3107.324.6−5.2
EBITDA99.5500.6121.126.5−7.1
EBIT649.2916.8130.824.4−10.4
EPSn/m811.0126.725.8−8.1
DPS0.015.213.20.00.0
Margins
Gross margin40.981.187.186.482.2
EBITDA margin48.581.787.288.586.8
EBIT margin26.174.683.182.978.3
FCF margin10.046.849.156.059.1
Cash conversion, FCF/net income43.673.369.478.385.4
Net interest / EBIT−3.70.20.82.14.6
Capex / sales36.920.519.918.919.9
Exhibit 9: ROCE of 174% at the peak, 2.2x book and 3.8x earnings at the price
Ratios and valuationFY25AFY26AFY27EFY28EFY29E
Returns and leverage
ROE15.861.458.342.327.9
ROA10.350.353.540.226.9
ROCE17.2141.7174.1152.5115.1
Net debt / equity4.9(49.3)(60.7)(67.9)(72.6)
Net debt / EBITDA0.2(0.5)(0.8)(1.3)(2.0)
Valuation at $658.70, 5 Nov 2026
P/E79.58.73.83.13.3
EV/EBITDA38.16.32.92.32.4
P/B13.85.42.21.30.9
FCF yield0.58.418.225.925.9
Dividend yield0.10.10.10.10.1
P/E at our $1,085 target——6.35.05.5

Source: Company filings (A); Penmark Research estimates (E). Ratios in %. ROE on closing equity, ROA on closing assets, ROCE on equity plus debt less cash. Values in brackets are net cash. Multiples at the 5 Nov 2026 price except the last row; EV/EBITDA on today's EV.

Exhibit 10: We are 3.0% below consensus on FY27E EPS and 3.6% above on FY28E
US$m, $ per shareQ1 FY27EFY27EFY28E
Revenue
Penmark estimate61,450276,057343,907
Consensus61,830275,510319,680
Prior-year period13,643133,188276,057
Diff. vs consensus−0.6%+0.2%+7.6%
Growth y/y, Penmark350.4%107.3%24.6%
Adjusted EPS, $
Penmark estimate37.78171.21215.36
Consensus38.20176.50207.80
Prior-year period4.7875.52171.21
Diff. vs consensus−1.1%−3.0%+3.6%
Growth y/y, Penmark690.4%126.7%25.8%

Source: Company filings; S&P Global consensus (29 Oct 2026), Yahoo Finance for Q1 (14 Oct 2026); Penmark Research estimates. Q1 FY27 guide beside consensus: revenue $60.0-63.0bn, EPS $37.15-39.15.

Exhibit 11: Micron at 3.7x forward earnings trades with the memory makers
MicronSamsung ElectronicsSK hynixSanDiskSeagate3.7x3.3x2.9x6.9x22.1x

Source: Company filings; aggregators, 3 Sep to 3 Nov 2026. Forward P/E on consensus 12-month earnings

Micron vs peersMicronPeer medianDiff.
Forward P/E3.7x3.3x+11%
P/E on FY28E EPS3.1x3.3x−6%
Op. margin, TTM (SanDisk)82.3%72.5%+9.8pp
Beta, 2-year (Micron)2.66x2.30x+0.36
DRAM share: Samsung, SK hynix24%38%, 25%−14, −1pp
HBM share: SK hynix, Samsung18%50%, 33%−32, −15pp

Source: Company filings; BofA for DRAM and HBM share (Oct 2026); Penmark Research estimates. Median of Samsung, SK hynix, SanDisk. Shares are each company's own, not medians. The 2.48x beta used in the model is the midpoint of 2.66x and 2.30x. Difference in % for multiples, pp for ratios.

Four dated events decide the call; NAND cleanroom space is the largest single risk

Exhibit 12: Four dated catalysts: Q1 results in December, the first SCA test in March
  • Dec 26Q1 FY27 results. Guide $61.5bn ±$1.5bn and EPS $38.15 ±$1.00; we model $61.45bn and $37.78, with 86.25% gross margin as the FY27 floor.
  • Mar 27Q2 FY27 results. CY27 HBM bits contracted at higher prices land in the P&L; we model 87.0% gross margin against Kioxia's view that NAND levels off.
  • 2H FY27CY28 contract talks and first SCA extensions. New and extended SCAs at floor prices; we model DRAM ASP +5% against consensus revenue of $319.7bn.

Source: Company filings and Q4 FY26 call (30 Sep 2026); Penmark Research estimates.

Exhibit 13: The base already holds five bull catalysts worth $215 a share; five bear risks worth $152 are not in it
  • In the base, lost if it fails: $215 a share. SCA floor path $134 (DRAM ASP −20/−40/−25% in FY29E-31E against the bear path); CY28 tightness $38; HBM repricing $18; server units $17; data-centre SSD share $8.
  • Not in the base, lost if it lands: $152 a share. NAND cleanrooms from 2H CY28 −$62; CXMT server DRAM −$29; NAND prices levelling −$26; slower cost per bit −$21; slower AI build −$14.
From the base, every catalyst is a risk.The only upside is the bull case ($1,653). The thesis is invalidated if DRAM contract pricing falls over 5% q/q before CY28 contracts are signed, or no SCA is extended at the Q2 FY27 print.

Source: Penmark Research model, Thesis tab (catalyst values per share against the base case). The five bear items overlap and do not add to the $404 gap between base and bear.

Exhibit 14: At 5.4x book the stock is inside its two-year range
0x2x4x6x8x10x12xJan-25Jul-25Jan-26Jul-26Mean 4.2x; bands ±1σ, ±2σ5.4x

Source: Exchanges; company filings. Monthly, price x 1,131m shares over book value

Exhibit 15: Only one cell of 25, 4.9x on 80% of model earnings, falls below the $659 price
$639$685$731$777$823$714$769$825$880$935$789$854$918$983$1048$864$938$1012$1086$1160$939$1022$1106$1189$1272Mid-cycle earnings vs model0.8x0.9x1.0x1.1x1.2xMid-cycle P/E4.9x5.9x6.9x7.9x8.9x

Source: Penmark Research estimates. Weighted value per share at the 3 Sep 2026 valuation date; each 10% off mid-cycle earnings is about $65 a share

Exhibit 16: What we watch, and the reading that would change the rating
IndicatorThesis confirmed ifThesis broken if
DRAM contract price, q/q4Q26 +10-15%, flat to up through CY27Down more than 5% q/q before CY28 contracts
SCA coverageAbove 35% of revenue to 2030, extended each printNo extension at Q2 FY27, or floors cut
HBM price vs commodityGap narrows as HBM4E ships through CY27HBM priced at or below commodity DRAM
Capex intensityAt or below 28% of revenue, matching bit growthAbove 35% without matching bit growth
Base-case floor pathFY31E EBIT margin holds near 55%DRAM follows the bear price path (−70%)
What would change our viewThe rating moves to Hold if the share price rises above $987, where the expected return to target falls below +10%. A CY28 contract signed below the floor would shift weight toward the $507 bear value, 23% under the current price. Each 10% off mid-cycle earnings costs about $65 a share (Exhibit 15).

3. The thesis in charts

Margin, not bit growth, is what the share price trades on

Micron's share price has tracked its gross margin through the upcycle: the market is pricing the durability of the margin, not the volume of bits. Each chart tests one leg of the call.

Exhibit 17: Gross margin and the share price move together: r = 0.88 over eight quarters
Non-GAAP gross margin, %Average share price in the quarter, $ (right)0%20%40%60%80%100%$0$200$400$600$800$1000Q1 FY25Q2 FY25Q3 FY25Q4 FY25Q1 FY26Q2 FY26Q3 FY26Q4 FY26

Source: Company filings; exchanges. Quarterly non-GAAP gross margin against the average daily close in the same quarter

Gross margin explains the stock, and the model explains gross margin. From Q1 FY25 to Q4 FY26 the margin rose 47.5pp and the average price from $100 to $957. Bear and base differ by 18.5pp of gross margin at the base trough, 3pp in FY28E.

We differ from consensus in one year only. FY27E revenue is within 0.2% of consensus; FY28E is 7.6% above it, worth $6 a share against the market, with the trough debate worth $252. The chart below right shows the same point on value: the two methods bracket $900 while the price sits at $659.

Exhibit 18: FY28E revenue is 7.6% above consensus; FY27E is in line
Consensus$0bn$100bn$200bn$300bn$400bnFY27EFY28E$276bn$344bn

Source: S&P Global consensus (29 Oct 2026); Penmark Research estimates

Exhibit 19: Cash and investments reach $592bn by FY29E, 80% of the market value
$0bn$200bn$400bn$600bnFY25AFY26AFY27EFY28EFY29EActualEstimates →$12bn$74bn$208bn$400bn$592bn

Source: Company filings (A); Penmark Research estimates (E)

Exhibit 20: Every line grows to FY28E and turns or stalls in FY29E
Revenue, $bnFY29E: $326FY25AFY29EGross margin, %FY29E: 82%FY25AFY29EEPS, $FY29E: $198FY25AFY29EFree cash flow, $bnFY29E: $193FY25AFY29E

Source: Company filings (A); Penmark Research estimates (E)

3. The thesis in charts (continued)

The bull and bear cases differ by the depth of one downturn, not by the next two years

Through FY28E the three cases sit within 30% of the base case on revenue; from FY29E they diverge by a factor of two, and that is what the $659 price argues about.

Exhibit 21: DRAM prices fall 64% to FY31E in the base case, 70% in the bear
BullBaseBear−60%−40%−20%0%+20%FY28EFY29EFY30EFY31E−20%−25%−10%

Source: Penmark Research estimates. Year-on-year change in DRAM average selling price

Exhibit 22: FY29E revenue is $326bn in the base case and $185bn in the bear
BullBaseBear$0bn$100bn$200bn$300bn$400bn$500bnFY27EFY28EFY29EFY30EFY31E

Source: Penmark Research estimates. Revenue, $bn

Exhibit 23: The build adds $81 a share to the quick estimate
$0$200$400$600$800$1000QuickestimateMid-cycleearningsFY27-28cash flowNet cashWeightedvalue$837+$106−$24$0$918

Source: Penmark Research estimates. Value per share at 3 Sep 2026

What the bridge saysThe quick estimate used a 55% mid-cycle EBIT margin on $250bn of revenue. The model's probability-weighted mid-cycle margin is 62.6% on $271bn because FY29E keeps most of the upcycle, adding $106 a share; working capital and $65bn of FY28E capex take $24 back.
The asymmetry sits in the troughMid-cycle EBIT margin is 43.9% in the bear, 62.0% in the base and 74.8% in the bull; in NOPAT the price ($86bn) sits between the bear ($61bn) and base ($139bn), closer to the bear. The depth of the FY29E-FY31E downturn is $252 of the $253 gap between price and base value. The base already carries all five bull catalysts and none of the bear ones.

Source: Penmark Research estimates; Thesis tab of the model.

Exhibit 24: The base rests on $215 a share of bull catalysts; another $152 is at risk from bears it excludes
SCA floor path (DRAM ASP vs bear path)DRAM ASP FY28E +5% vs flatHBM pricing and margin (Bull 2)Server units and CSP capexData-centre SSD shareNAND cleanrooms from 2H CY28CXMT server DRAMNAND prices level (Bear 4)Slower cost per bit declineSlower AI and HBM demand$134$38$18$17$8−$62−$29−$26−$21−$14

Source: Penmark Research model, Thesis tab. Top five: in the base, lost if it fails ($215). Bottom five: not in the base, lost if it lands ($152). Value per share against the base case; items overlap

4. Key debates

Three debates, and only the third one is worth $252 a share

The market and we agree on the next twelve months. The argument is about what happens after the peak: the price discounts $86bn of mid-cycle NOPAT, against $139bn in our base (62.0% EBIT margin) and $61bn in the bear.

Exhibit 25: The three debates, what the market assumes and when each resolves
DebateMarket viewPenmark viewEvidenceWhat would change our viewResolves
1. FY27E exit pricing: HBM repricing against NAND levelling FY27E EPS $176.50 with gross margin flat near 86% after the Q1 guide. FY27E EPS $171.21; margin rises to 87.0-87.5% as CY27 HBM bits land. Most CY27 HBM bits contracted at significant price rises (Q4 FY26 call); TrendForce sees HBM blended ASP up 121% in 2027; Kioxia says NAND is levelling (2 Nov 2026). Q2 FY27 gross margin below the 86.25% Q1 guide.Mar 2027
2. CY28 tightness and FY28E pricing FY28E revenue $319.7bn, up 16% on FY27E. $343.9bn, up 24.6%, on DRAM ASP +5% and 20% bit growth. Management sees CY27-28 tighter than CY26, no line of sight to balance (30 Sep 2026); ID2, Japan and Singapore NAND land late CY28. CY28 contracts signed at or below CY27 prices.2H FY27
3. Depth of the FY29E-FY31E downturn Price-implied: $86bn of mid-cycle NOPAT, a 37.5% EBIT margin on base-like revenue of $271bn. Base: 62.0% mid-cycle EBIT margin and $139bn of NOPAT; FY31E trough 55% EBIT, 62.3% gross. 26 supply agreements cover over 35% of revenue to 2030 at floor prices above any prior peak; RPO about $150bn at minimum prices and $12.7bn of customer cash deposits. A CY28 contract signed below the floor price.Late CY28

Source: Company filings and Q4 FY26 call (30 Sep 2026); S&P Global consensus (29 Oct 2026); TrendForce (29 Sep, 20 Oct 2026); Kioxia (2 Nov 2026); Penmark Research estimates.

Exhibit 26: The trough debate is worth $252 a share; the other two $1
FY27E exit pricingCY28 tightnessDepth of FY29E-FY31Etrough−$5$6$252

Source: Penmark Research; Market Check. Base-case value less the value at the market's view

Debate 3 carries 99% of the gap. On the first two we are within $6 a share of the market. The trough is different: it requires believing that contract floors hold through a downturn.

The evidence is contractual, not cyclical. Customers paid $12.7bn up front for supply at minimum prices, which makes the floor a liability on both sides if breached. We therefore weight base 45% against bear 35%.

What is already priced. 28 of 30 FY27E EPS revisions were up in 30 days and the stock is 46% below its June high: the debate is no longer demand, but the margin in the year after next.

Exhibit 27: The three debates resolve between December and late CY28
15 Dec 2026Q1 FY27 printGuide $61.5bn, 86.25%margin25 Mar 2027Q2 FY27 printDebate 1 resolves: HBMrepricing vs NAND30 Sep 2027CY28 contractsDebate 2 resolves: pricingfor FY28E1 Oct 2028New cleanroomsDebate 3 resolves: depthof the trough

Source: Company calendar; Penmark Research estimates

5. How the company makes money

$133bn of revenue from selling bits at contract prices, and $99bn of it reaches operating profit

Micron makes DRAM and NAND and sells them to four customer groups on quarterly contracts, increasingly with floor prices. A new fab takes four to five years, so price, not volume, decides profit.

Exhibit 28: Six panels, FY26A: customers pay for bits, and 19 cents of every dollar covers the fab

Customers

Hyperscalers and CSPs
$43.1bn Cloud Memory
Server and storage OEMs
$37.6bn Core Data Center
Phone and PC makers
$36.6bn Mobile and Client
Auto and industrial
$15.9bn Automotive

Offerings

DRAM, incl. HBM
$100.7bn, 76% of revenue
NAND, incl. data-centre SSD
$31.8bn, 24% of revenue
NOR and other
$0.7bn

Revenue streams

26 SCAs: >35% of revenue to 2030 at floor prices
Quarterly contracts and spot for the balance
RPO ~$150bn at minimum prices; $12.7bn of cash deposits

Channels

Direct to hyperscalers and OEMs: ~85% of revenue
Distributors and catalogues for auto and industrial
Four business units

Cost to serve

Cost of goods $25.7bn, 19% of revenue, of which D&A $9.5bn
R&D $5.7bn; SG&A and other $2.5bn
Capex, net $27.4bn, 21% of revenue

What is left

Operating profit $99.3bn, a 74.6% margin
Free cash flow $62.3bn after $27.4bn of net capex
Net cash $55.4bn after $12.9bn of customer deposits
+60%DRAM ASP, q/q, Q3 FY26
87.0%Non-GAAP gross margin, Q4 FY26
63%Data-centre share of revenue, Q4 FY26
18%HBM share, Q3 CY26
$55.4bnNet cash after SCA deposits

Source: Company filings (A); Q4 FY26 call and earnings deck (30 Sep 2026); BofA for HBM share (Oct 2026); Penmark Research estimates for the direct-channel share. FY26A, $bn.

Pricing is quarterly, and the contract book is the new part. Volume comes from Micron's own fabs; price is set quarterly. Since FY26 it has signed 26 supply agreements covering over 35% of revenue to 2030 at floor prices, with $12.7bn of cash up front and a ~$150bn backlog at minimum prices — part of a spot business is now contracted.

Costs are fixed, so incremental revenue falls to profit. Cost of goods is 19% of revenue in FY26 against 60% in FY25, not because costs fell but because price rose; cash cost per bit falls about 6% a year. Each 1pp of gross margin is worth $1.3bn of operating profit.

Profit and cash diverge through capex and working capital. FY26 converted 73% of net income to free cash flow; the gap is $27.4bn of net capex and a $4.6bn working-capital build as receivables grew with revenue. From FY27E capex rises to $55bn and then $65bn, which is why cash conversion falls to 69% before recovering to 85% in FY29E.

Concentration is by customer type. Data-centre customers — hyperscalers and server OEMs — are 61% of FY26A revenue and 63% in Q4, up from 57% eight quarters ago, and the largest single agreement covers a mid-single-digit share of revenue. That concentration is why the SCA floor matters: a handful of buyers can underwrite a fab, and they have.

What it means for valueProfits are price × bits on a fixed cost base, so the business is worth the mid-cycle margin the contract book can defend — which is why we value a 62.0% base mid-cycle EBIT margin rather than FY27E peak earnings, and why the floor price in an SCA is the model's most valuable datapoint.

5. How the company makes money (continued)

A fifth of revenue covers the fab; three-quarters reaches operating profit

Two charts carry the model: where $133.2bn of revenue goes, and what produces it. Revenue is bits × price, and FY26 growth came from price, so we forecast ASP first.

Exhibit 29: Of $133.2bn of revenue, $99.3bn reaches operating profit
DRAM$100.7bnNAND$31.8bnOther$0.7bnRevenue$133.2bnCost of revenue$25.7bnGross profit$107.5bnR&D$5.7bnSG&A and other$2.5bnOperating profit$99.3bn

Source: 10-K FY26 (filed 9 Oct 2026). GAAP; $bn

Exhibit 30: Bits times price: DRAM supplies 76% of revenue and all of the growth
Bits +mid-20s%ASP +60% in Q3 FY26 aloneDRAM $100.7bn, 76%Bits +~10% q/qASP +80% in Q3 FY26NAND $31.8bn, 24%Other $0.7bn, 0.5%Revenue $133.2bn, +256%

Source: Company filings; Q4 FY26 call. Growth rates as disclosed, ranges not points

Price, not bits, produced FY26. DRAM bits grew in the mid-20s percent while DRAM revenue rose 252%. The model forecasts ASP first and calibrates bits to it, with cash cost per bit falling 6% a year.

The business units are a customer lens on the same fabs. Cloud Memory and Core Data Center sell the same DRAM at different prices, so their margins differ.

Exhibit 31: Cloud Memory and Core Data Center are 61% of revenue
Cloud Memory$43.1bn$43.1bn (32%)Core Data Center$37.6bn$37.6bn (28%)Mobile and Client $36.6bn$36.6bn (27%)Automotive $15.9bn$15.9bn (12%)

Source: Company filings; sum of FY26 quarters, $bn

What it means for valueA 10% move in DRAM ASP at FY27E is worth $20.5bn of revenue and about $18bn of operating profit. In the model, FY28E DRAM ASP of +5% against flat is worth $37.84 a share.

5. How the company makes money (continued)

Core Data Center is 12x its FY25 trough, and every unit earns a 76-88% operating margin

The four business units are the same wafer sold to different buyers. In the upcycle all four earn extraordinary margins; what separates them is how quickly their prices reset when supply loosens, which is why the model weights data-centre revenue as the last to fall.

Exhibit 32: Core Data Center revenue is 12x its FY25 trough
Core Data CenterCloud MemoryMobile and ClientAutomotive and Embedded$0bn$20bn$40bn$60bnQ1FY25Q2FY25Q3FY25Q4FY25Q1FY26Q2FY26Q3FY26Q4FY26$9bn$8bn$9bn$11bn$14bn$24bn$41bn$54bn

Source: Company filings; quarterly revenue by business unit, $bn

Exhibit 33: Automotive earns 79% and Cloud 76%: six and nine points below Core Data Center at 85%
Business unitFY26 rev. $bnShareQ4 grossQ4 op.
Cloud Memory43.132%83%76%
Core Data Center37.628%90%85%
Mobile and Client36.627%90%88%
Auto and Embedded15.912%84%79%
Total, as reported133.2100%87.0%82.3%
Growth in the latest quarter, q/q
Core Data Center+56%—+3pp+2pp
Cloud Memory+18%—0pp−2pp
Mobile and Client+14%—+3pp+2pp
Auto and Embedded+47%—+5pp+4pp

Source: Company filings; Q4 FY26 earnings deck (30 Sep 2026). Unit margins as disclosed; margins are Q4 FY26; the total is the reported Q4 non-GAAP gross and operating margin; revenue is the FY26 sum of quarters.

Exhibit 34: DRAM has been 73-79% of revenue through the entire upcycle
0%20%40%60%80%100%Q1 FY25Q2 FY25Q3 FY25Q4 FY25Q1 FY26Q2 FY26Q3 FY26Q4 FY26DRAMNANDOther

Source: Company filings; quarterly revenue by technology, $bn

Mix has not moved, and that is the point. DRAM has been 73-79% of revenue in every one of the last eight quarters. The shift is inside the mix: data-centre DRAM and HBM take a larger share of DRAM bits, and data-centre SSD is now more than two-thirds of NAND revenue at about $10bn in Q4 FY26.

The unit that resets first is the one to watch. Mobile and Client carries the highest operating margin at 88% because it reprices every quarter, so it is the first to turn in a downturn. Our FY29E revenue fall of 5% assumes mobile resets first and data-centre contracts hold through the year.

6. The market

A $420bn DRAM market in FY26, in month twelve of an upcycle with no new supply until late CY28

Memory is a bit-growth market priced quarterly. Industry DRAM bits grow in the low-20s percent a year, cost per bit falls about 6%, and price does the rest. FY26 was the year price ran ahead of bits: the market more than tripled to $420bn on a 24% share held by Micron.

Exhibit 35: The DRAM market is $420bn in FY26, up from $119bn a year earlier
$0bn$250bn$500bn$750bn$1000bn$1250bnFY24AFY25AFY26AFY27EFY28EActualEstimates →$73bn$119bn$420bn$856bn$1079bn

Source: Company filings; Penmark Research estimates. Micron DRAM revenue grossed up at a 24% share (BofA, Q2 CY26), $bn

Demand is now a data-centre number. Server units are guided up high teens in CY26 and CY27, and memory is 68% of cloud capex in 2027 (TrendForce). Micron's data-centre business units are 63% of revenue against 57% eight quarters ago, and data-centre SSD is more than two-thirds of NAND.

Supply cannot respond before late CY28. A greenfield fab takes four to five years and a cleanroom about two. Micron's own additions — Singapore HBM packaging early CY27, ID1 and Tongluo mid-CY27, ID2 and Japan late CY28, Singapore NAND 2H CY28, New York CY30 — set the timetable for the whole industry's next oversupply.

Cycle position: late but not over. Inventory in the channel is at record lows, more than 75% of FY27 output is committed, and pricing is still rising quarter on quarter. The bear case does not dispute that; it argues the turn comes a year early.

Exhibit 36: Memory makers keep 43% of a $1.0tn chain; equipment takes the capex
EquipmentASML, Applied, Lam,TEL$55-65bn a yearfrom Micron aloneMaterialsShin-Etsu, Sumco,EntegrisWafer and chemicalsupplyMemorySamsung, SK hynix,Micron, CXMT$420bn DRAM, 87%held by threeModules and HBMMemory makers,OSATsStacking and testSystemsDell, HPE,Supermicro, FoxconnServers and devicesCloudHyperscalersThe end demand,63% of MicronrevenueWhere Micron earns

Source: Company filings; TrendForce; Penmark Research. Stage detail by FY26A revenue or capex

The profit pool sits in the three suppliers. Memory makers keep 43% of the value of the chain and take almost all of the cyclical risk: equipment suppliers are paid whether the cycle turns or not, and systems vendors pass memory cost through. That is why a 20% price move changes Micron's profit by more than it changes Dell's.

Two threats are real and one is not. CXMT's 10% DRAM share and its server DDR5 push are real and drive our bear case. HBM 8-high stacks cutting HBM per GPU is real but margin-neutral for Micron, since it raises bit volume. Substitution of DRAM by any other technology is not a threat in this cycle.

What it means for valueMarket size is not the constraint; price is. Even on our FY30E, when base DRAM ASP has fallen 52% from FY28E, industry DRAM revenue implied by Micron's 24% share is still about 5.9x its FY25 level, and Micron earns a 64.4% EBIT margin on it. The forecast therefore never assumes a return to the FY23 market — only to a normal price for a much larger market.

7. Competitive position

Third of three in DRAM and HBM alike: the contract book is the only durable advantage

Micron competes on cost and node, and it is neither the largest nor the lowest-cost producer. What it has built instead is a customer relationship — 26 supply agreements with floor prices and cash deposits — that we have not seen matched in its rivals' public disclosure.

Exhibit 37: Micron holds 24% of DRAM but only 18% of HBM
DRAM share, Q2 CY26HBM share, Q3 CY26Samsung ElectronicsSK hynixMicronCXMT38%33%25%50%24%18%10%

Source: BofA (Oct 2026); TrendForce. Share of industry revenue

Exhibit 38: Micron ranks third on DRAM and HBM share and is the only one disclosing floor-price contracts
Choice criterionMicronSamsungSK hynix
Position at Q2-Q3 CY26
DRAM share24%38%25%
HBM share18%33%50%
Sources of advantage
Contract coverage26 SCAs, 35%+Not disclosedNot disclosed
Evidence it lasts
Floor-price contractsFloors on 35%Not disclosedNot disclosed

Source: Company filings; BofA (Oct 2026); TrendForce; Penmark Research estimates. Samsung and SK hynix do not disclose contract coverage.

The advantage is contractual, and it is new. Scale and node leadership belong to Samsung and SK hynix; Micron's 24% DRAM share is the third largest. What changed in FY26 is the contract book: 26 supply agreements covering more than 35% of revenue to 2030 at floor prices, $32bn of customer commitments and $12.7bn of cash already received.

A floor price is only as good as the customer's incentive to honour it. Customers posted cash, which makes walking away expensive for them and turns the floor into a shared liability. That is a stronger mechanism than a long-term agreement without deposits.

The weak spot is HBM. At 18% of HBM against SK hynix's 50%, Micron is a price taker in the fastest-growing part of DRAM, and SK hynix leads on HBM share. Our bull case does not require Micron to gain HBM share; it requires HBM pricing to narrow toward commodity DRAM as supply catches up, which lifts Micron's blended ASP without a share gain.

CXMT is the structural threat, not the cyclical one. At 10% of DRAM and pushing server DDR5, CXMT adds supply where pricing is richest. Its cost base is state-supported, so it will not exit at the trough the way a listed producer would — which is precisely what our bear case capitalises.

The strongest evidence against the moatSamsung and SK hynix do not disclose contract coverage, so we can show only that no rival has published equivalents, not that Micron's 26 agreements are unique. If either rival signs comparable floors, the contract book stops differentiating Micron, although a firmer industry trough would still support our valuation.
What it means for valueWe do not pay Micron for scale it does not have. The 6.9x mid-cycle multiple is a justified multiple from our cost of capital, 3% growth and 20% return on new capital; the value comes from the 62.0% base mid-cycle EBIT margin the contracts defend, not from a re-rating against SK hynix.

8. Management, governance and capital allocation

Management has beaten its own guide four quarters running and spent five years ploughing cash into fabs

Sanjay Mehrotra is chief executive and has been chair since January 2025, Lynn Dugle is lead independent director, and Mark Murphy has been chief financial officer since 2022. On the record we can test, they deliver: the last four quarters beat the top of guidance on revenue, and the last two beat on gross margin and EPS as well. Capital has gone into capacity, not into the share count.

Exhibit 39: Of $132bn of operating cash flow in five years, $69bn went to capex and $6bn to shareholders
Operating cash flowCapex, netRetainedBuybacksDividends$132.4bn$69.3bn$56.7bn$3.8bn$2.6bn

Source: Company filings; 10-K FY22-FY26 (five-year sums, FY25-26 capex net of incentives). $bn, linear scale

Exhibit 40: Capital deployment and the guidance record
Five years to FY26AUS$bnShare of CFO
Operating cash flow132.4100%
Capex (net of incentives, FY25-26)69.352%
Buybacks3.83%
Dividends2.62%
Retained for capacity and cash56.743%
Guidance record, Q4 FY26
Revenue vs guide, Q454.2 vs 49.0-51.0+8.5%
EPS vs guide, Q4$33.42 vs $30-32+7.8%
Q1-Q3 FY26 revenueEach above the top of guidance
Returned from 9 December 2026
Buyback authorization35.16New
Dividend, annualised0.600.1% yield

Source: 10-K FY22-FY26; Q4 FY26 release and call (30 Sep 2026); Zacks. FY25-26 capex is net of incentives. Shares of operating cash flow are five-year sums.

The record is delivery, not promises. Four consecutive quarters beat the top of revenue guidance and the Q4 FY26 print beat on revenue, gross margin and EPS together. The FY27 guide extends the pattern: record revenue, sequential growth every quarter, and the Q1 gross margin of 86.25% set explicitly as the floor for the year.

Capital allocation has been pro-cyclical and is only now turning. Of $132.4bn of operating cash flow over five years, $69.3bn went into capex and $6.4bn into buybacks and dividends. The $35.16bn authorization that starts on 9 December 2026 is a new return commitment, and management's stated intent is to return 100% of excess cash over time.

Governance: the chair and chief executive are the same person, with a lead independent director. Mehrotra holds both roles, which concentrates accountability in a capital-intensive business where the board's main job is to police capacity spending. The counterweight is a balance sheet with $55.4bn of net cash and a BBB+ rating from all three agencies, so the capacity plan is not funded with leverage.

Insider activity is routine and small. The chief technology officer, Scott DeBoer, sold 28,444 shares at $900 on 16 October 2026 under a pre-arranged 10b5-1 plan and still holds 147,430 shares; there have been no open-market purchases.

What it means for valueManagement's delivery supports the base case rather than the bull case: the guide is credible, but the return of capital only begins in December. The model holds the share count at 1,150m and treats the buyback as value-neutral, so it does not enter our per-share values.

9. What moves the stock

The stock trades on DRAM price and margin, not the contract book

We tested five candidate drivers against four tests: the move around the last eight results, the split of the twelve-month return, the variance explained by market, sector and peers, and the topics raised on the Q4 FY26 call. Two pass most tests; the contract floor, which carries most of our value, fails every price test today.

DriverWhat it does to the stockTests passedMarket vs our modelDebateNext number to watch
DRAM contract priceMoves revenue and margin together; r = 0.88 with the average share price over eight quarters4 of 4Price-implied $86bn of mid-cycle NOPAT (37.5% EBIT margin); base $139bn (62.0%)1, 34Q26 contracts, +10-15% q/q (TrendForce), Dec 2026
Non-GAAP gross marginThe line the market reprices on: the Q3 FY26 margin beat drove +15.4%3 of 486.25% Q1 guide against our 86.25%; FY27E 87.1%1Q1 FY27 print, Dec 2026
Capex intensitySets free cash flow; explains the March 2026 drawdown2 of 421% of FY26 revenue (net); 20% in FY27E at $55bn2FY27 capex, Q1 and Q2 prints
SCA floor priceSets the trough margin, so most of our value; no reaction has tested it1 of 4No SCA has yet been tested by a downturn3New SCA at the Q2 FY27 print, March 2027

Source: Company filings; exchanges; TrendForce; Penmark Research estimates. Tests passed out of four: results-day reaction, return decomposition, factor sensitivity, call Q&A.

Exhibit 41: Results days moved the stock between −10% and +15% in eight quarters
−20%−10%0%10%20%Q1FY25Q2FY25Q3FY25Q4FY25Q1FY26Q2FY26Q3FY26Q4FY263%−7%−2%−2%7%−10%15%3%

Source: Exchanges; company filings. Close-to-close move from the session before the release to one session after

Exhibit 42: Trailing P/E fell from 28.7x to 8.7x in twelve months as earnings rose ninefold
0x10x20x30xNov 2025Nov 202628.7x8.7x

Source: Company filings; exchanges. Price at each date over trailing non-GAAP EPS; EV/EBITDA and P/B are not shown because the model holds only FY25 balance-sheet items at the earlier date

Exhibit 43: The price implies $86bn of mid-cycle NOPAT, between the bear's $61bn and the base case's $139bn
Bear, floors failPrice-impliedBase, floors hold$61bn$86bn$139bn

Source: Penmark Research model, Valuation and Market Check tabs. Mid-cycle NOPAT FY29E-FY36E; price-implied solved so the model reproduces the $659 price. Compared in NOPAT, not margin, because the price-implied 37.5% EBIT margin sits on base-like revenue of $271bn and the bear's 43.9% on $165bn

9. What moves the stock (continued)

Three drivers explain the price; the fourth is $134 a share of the gap and is untested

Exhibit 44: The sector explains 58% of Micron's weekly variance, the market alone 28%
S&P 500Semiconductor indexMemory peers28%58%47%

Source: Exchanges. 103 weekly returns to 5 Nov 2026; separate regressions of Micron on each factor

Exhibit 45: Capital return and capex took half the questions on the Q4 FY26 call
Capital returnCapex intensityHBM pricing and despecSCA coverage2028 pricing22211

Source: Q4 FY26 earnings call Q&A (30 Sep 2026); five analysts, eight topics

Driver 1. DRAM contract price — the stock is a price instrument, and the price is still rising

What the market does: a 60% sequential DRAM ASP rise in Q3 FY26 produced the 176% twelve-month return, and the correlation between average quarterly share price and gross margin is 0.88 across eight quarters. Sector beta explains 58% of weekly variance and memory peers 47%, so Micron trades as a price proxy, not as a company.
What our model says: FY27E DRAM revenue of $205.5bn comes from that quarterly build. Built quarterly on ASP of +12%, +8%, +3% and +1% and bits of +1%, +3%, +4% and +5%, the year compounds to +104% DRAM revenue. In the model, FY28E DRAM ASP +5% against flat is worth +$37.84 a share and the CXMT server DRAM scenario −$29.34.
Debate 1 and 3. Next number: 4Q26 DRAM contract settlement, guided +10-15% q/q (TrendForce), December 2026. We expect +12%; the eight-event study is too small to size a price reaction.

Driver 2. Gross margin — the single line that reprices the equity

What the market does: the Q3 FY26 print (84.9% gross margin against 78% expected) drove +15.4% in two sessions, the largest reaction in eight quarters; the Q1 FY27 guide of 86.25% is now treated as a floor by the sell side.
What our model says: 87.1% for FY27E and 86.4% in FY28E, with cost per bit down 6% and a 68% incremental margin. The model values HBM repricing at +$18.19 a share and NAND prices levelling at −$26.06.
Debate 1. Next number: Q1 FY27 gross margin, December 2026: guide 86.0-86.5%, our model 86.25%, consensus 85.7%. A miss below 85% breaks the margin narrative and the stock.

Driver 3. The contract floor — $134 a share of the base-to-price gap

What the market does: nothing yet. No SCA has been tested by a downturn, only one analyst asked about coverage, and the price implies a 37.5% mid-cycle EBIT margin — the FY18 prior-cycle peak was 49.3% — against our base mid-cycle 62.0%.
What our model says: the floor path (DRAM ASP −20/−40/−25% in FY29E-31E against the bear path) is worth +$134.44 a share, 53% of the gap between our base value and the price.
Debate 3. Next number: the Q2 FY27 print in March 2027, when the first SCA renegotiation is disclosed: coverage above 40% of revenue confirms, a renegotiation at spot prices breaks it.

Candidates tested and droppedWhy the market assumes it mattersWhy it fails our tests
HBM market shareThe fastest-growing product lineShare is 18% and has been stable; no results-day reaction to HBM share news in eight quarters
Hyperscaler capexSets memory demandExplains demand, not the price; adds no variance once the sector factor is included
Buyback authorization$35.16bn from December 2026Not yet in force; the model treats it as value-neutral
PC and phone unitsThe traditional memory demand driverClient is 27% of revenue; unit growth has been flat while revenue tripled

Source: Company filings; exchanges; S&P Global; TrendForce; Penmark Research estimates. Limits: the event study covers eight observations, so single-quarter reactions carry wide error bands, and no SCA has yet been tested by a downturn.

10. Thesis chapter 1 | Driver: DRAM contract price

Pricing is contracted now, and the contracts were signed at the bottom of the cycle

The claim. Micron has converted more than a third of its revenue into multi-year agreements with floor prices and customer cash, so the next pricing cycle starts from a contractual floor rather than from spot. Consensus models the price path but not the floor under it.

2. What the market believes

Consensus has FY27E revenue at $275.5bn against our $276.1bn — a 0.2% difference — and FY28E at $319.7bn against our $343.9bn, so the disagreement is entirely about FY28 and beyond (+7.6%). The price is consistent with $86bn of mid-cycle NOPAT, a 37.5% EBIT margin on base-like revenue; FY18 was 49.3% and only FY26 has been higher in the reported record we hold. Our base is 62.0%.

In other words the market accepts the FY27 price path and treats FY28 as the peak before a normal memory collapse. It does not give Micron credit for the mechanism that would make the collapse shallower.

4. What it is worth

The debate values are −$4.93 a share on FY27E exit pricing, +$6.10 on CY28 pricing and +$251.5 on the depth of the FY29E-FY31E downturn. FY28E DRAM ASP +5% against flat is worth $37.84.

3. The evidence, three independent sources

  • Filings. The FY26 10-K discloses 26 supply agreements covering more than 35% of revenue to 2030 at floor prices, with $12.7bn of cash deposits received and about $150bn of remaining performance obligations at minimum prices.
  • Pricing data. DRAM ASP rose 60% sequentially in Q3 FY26 and NAND 80%; 4Q26 contracts settled a further 10-15% higher (TrendForce). Price per bit is now 3.4x its FY25 average.
  • Guidance. Q1 FY27 revenue is guided to $60-63bn with an 86.0-86.5% gross margin, and management called FY27 "another record year" on 30 September 2026. Guidance has been beaten at the top end four quarters running.
  • Industry structure. Three suppliers hold 87% of DRAM and CY27 industry bit growth is guided to the low-20s, below the demand implied by 68% memory content in 2027 cloud capex.
Exhibit 46: DRAM ASP rose 60% in Q3 FY26 alone; the base has +12% in Q1 FY27E and +1% by Q4
0%25%50%75%100%125%Q1 FY26AQ2 FY26AQ3 FY26AQ4 FY26AQ1 FY27EQ2 FY27EQ3 FY27EQ4 FY27EActualEstimates →20%110%60%27%12%8%3%1%

Source: Company filings (A); Penmark Research estimates (E), Assumptions tab. Q4 FY26 on a revenue-per-bit basis

SignpostsDateThesis confirmed ifThesis broken if
4Q26 DRAM contract settlementDec 2026+10% or more q/qFlat or down
Q1 FY27 resultsDec 2026Revenue above $63bn and margin at or above 86.5%Margin below 85%
Q2 FY27 SCA disclosureMar 2027Coverage rises above 40% of revenueAn SCA renegotiated to spot

Source: Company filings; Penmark Research estimates. Dates are expected reporting dates, not company-confirmed.

11. Thesis chapter 2 | Driver: capex and supply timing

No meaningful new supply before late 2028, so FY28 is a growth year and not the peak

The claim. The industry's next capacity arrives between mid-CY27 and CY30, and most of it is committed to HBM packaging rather than to commodity bits. That makes FY28E a growth year, which is where our forecast diverges from consensus by the widest margin.

2. What the market believes

Consensus has FY27E EPS at $176.50 and FY28E at $207.80, a 17.7% increase, then assumes a fall. Our FY27E is $171.21, 3.0% below consensus, and our FY28E is $215.36, 3.6% above it — so we are more cautious on FY27 and more constructive on FY28.

The gap is not about demand. It is about the date supply arrives: consensus treats FY28 as the first year of oversupply, we treat it as the last year of tightness.

4. What it is worth

Our FY28E EPS is $7.56 above consensus. Debate 2 puts that at $6.10 a share against the market's path; FY28E DRAM ASP +5% against flat is worth $37.84. The supply calendar also protects FY29E: we model a 5% revenue fall that year, not the 30% a normal downcycle would deliver.

3. The evidence, three independent sources

  • Disclosed capacity calendar. Singapore HBM packaging in early CY27, ID1 and Tongluo cleanrooms in mid-CY27, ID2 and Hiroshima in late CY28, Singapore NAND in 2H CY28 and New York in CY30 — a gap in commodity bit capacity until late CY28.
  • Capex versus depreciation. FY27E capex of $55bn is about 3x depreciation, but 40% of it is HBM packaging, EUV and US greenfield — spending that adds value per wafer, not wafers. Industry bit growth is guided to the low-20s for CY27 and CY28.
  • Sold-out position. Management has said more than 75% of FY27 output is committed and that FY27 will grow every quarter. A supplier with that visibility does not cut price to fill capacity.
  • Behaviour of the other two. Samsung and SK hynix are prioritising HBM capacity over commodity DRAM, which removes commodity bits even as total wafer capacity rises.
Exhibit 47: The next supply lands between mid-CY27 and CY30, and most of it is HBM
early CY27Singapore HBM packagingmid CY27ID1 and Tongluocleanrooms1H CY28HBM4E ramplate CY28ID2 and Hiroshima2H CY28Singapore NANDCY30New York first wafer

Source: Company filings; Q4 FY26 call (30 Sep 2026). Announced capacity additions by first output

SignpostsDateThesis confirmed ifThesis broken if
Singapore HBM packaging output1Q CY27Starts on schedule and is HBM-onlyConverted to commodity DRAM
Samsung and SK hynix capex guidanceJan 20272027 capex growth below 10%Above 25%, led by commodity DRAM
ID1 and Tongluo cleanroom outfittingMid CY27Tool move-in slips to CY28Wafer starts pulled into 2H CY27

Source: Company filings; Penmark Research estimates. Dates are our expectations from disclosures, not company-confirmed schedules.

12. Thesis chapter 3 | Driver: the SCA floor price

The base holds the next trough at a 55% EBIT margin; the floor path is worth $134 a share

The claim. Micron had no contract floor under its price in the FY23 downturn; it now has one for more than a third of revenue, backed by $12.7bn of customer cash. That changes the shape of the next trough, which is what our valuation capitalises and what the share price does not.

2. What the market believes

The price is consistent with $86bn of mid-cycle NOPAT, a 37.5% EBIT margin, against our base of $139bn (62.0%) and a bear of $61bn (43.9%). In effect the market pays for a normal memory cycle with a normal trough, like FY23.

The 37.5% price-implied margin sits below the 49.3% operating margin Micron earned at the FY18 prior-cycle peak.

4. What it is worth

The floor price path against the bear path (DRAM ASP −20/−40/−25% in FY29E-31E) is worth $134.44 a share, 53% of the difference between our $911 base value and the price.

3. The evidence, three independent sources

  • The contracts themselves. 26 SCAs covering over 35% of revenue to 2030 at floor prices, $32bn of customer commitments, $12.7bn of cash deposits and about $150bn of RPO at minimum prices. The deposits make walking away expensive for the buyer, not just the seller.
  • Reported behaviour in the upcycle. With more than 75% of FY27 output committed, Micron has stopped selling on spot; the FY26 gross margin of 81.1% was earned with a contract book in place, not in a spot market.
  • The historical counterfactual. In FY23, with no contract book, the operating margin fell to −37% and the company lost $5.8bn. Our FY29E-FY31E margins slide from 78% to 55%, and the bear case takes the trough to 44%.
  • Where the risk sits. The floor covers DRAM sold to data-centre customers, not NAND and not client. The NAND cleanroom bear item is worth −$61.62 a share precisely because NAND has no equivalent floor.
Exhibit 48: Even our downturn leaves the EBIT margin at 55%, not the FY23 trough
0%50%FY22AFY24AFY26AFY28EFY30EActualEstimates →55%

Source: Company filings (A); Penmark Research estimates (E). Operating margin, GAAP

Exhibit 49: The price implies a 37.5% mid-cycle margin; our base is 62.0%
FY23 troughMarket-impliedPenmark base−50%−25%0%25%50%75%−37%38%63%

Source: Company filings; Penmark Research estimates. Market-implied margin solved from the $658.70 close

SignpostsDateThesis confirmed ifThesis broken if
First SCA renegotiation disclosedMar 2027Renewed at or above the original floorRepriced to spot
CXMT server DDR5 qualification1H CY27Confined to China OEMsQualified by a US hyperscaler

Source: Company filings; TrendForce; Penmark Research estimates. Dates are expected, not company-confirmed.

13. Forecasts

Revenue doubles in FY27 on the level of price, then falls 30% in FY30 when the cycle turns

We build revenue as bits × price for DRAM and NAND, with cash cost per bit falling 6% a year. FY27E revenue of $276.1bn doubles because the full year carries prices that only arrived in the second half of FY26, which is why the driver rows below begin in FY28E.

Exhibit 50: The revenue equation: FY27E is built quarterly, then bits carry the year
Base caseFY26AFY27EFY28EFY29EFY30E
DRAM bit shipments, growth—Quarterly+20%+18%+15%
DRAM ASP, change—Quarterly+5%−20%−40%
NAND bit shipments, growth—Quarterly+22%+20%+18%
NAND ASP, change—Quarterly−1%−20%−40%
Cash cost per bit, change−10%−6%−6%−6%−6%
Revenue, $m133,188276,057343,907326,153227,095
Growth+256%+107%+25%−5%−30%
Gross margin, non-GAAP81.1%87.1%86.4%82.2%70.3%
EBITDA, $m109,344240,679304,421282,943180,565
Depreciation and amortisation, $m9,50311,39619,24527,48134,234
Capex, net, $m27,36755,00065,00065,00063,587
Free cash flow to the firm, $m62,308132,137185,720180,832108,165

Source: Company filings (A); Penmark Research estimates (E). FY27E is built quarter by quarter (DRAM ASP +12%, +8%, +3%, +1%; bits +1%, +3%, +4%, +5%), so no single annual change describes it. FY26A EBITDA and operating expense are on the non-GAAP basis.

Exhibit 51: DRAM revenue flattens at $57bn a quarter in FY27E
DRAMNAND$0bn$20bn$40bn$60bnQ1FY26AQ2FY26AQ3FY26AQ4FY26AQ1FY27EQ2FY27EQ3FY27EQ4FY27EActualEstimates →

Source: Company filings (A); Penmark Research estimates (E). Quarterly revenue, $bn

The path is a plateau, not a spike. FY27E revenue grows 5-13% a quarter and reaches $75.5bn in Q4 FY27E. FY28E adds 25% on bit growth of 18-20% before DRAM ASP falls 20% in FY29E, and the decline comes in FY29E-FY31E, when base DRAM ASP falls 20%, 40% and 25%.

Costs: fixed, depreciated and slow to fall

Opex grows from $6.8bn to $11.1bn over four years, a 13% compound rate on R&D. Depreciation triples to $34.2bn as the $185bn of FY27E-FY29E capex is put in service, which is why the gross margin falls to 70.3% in FY30E even with cost per bit down 6% a year. The trough is a price event, not a cost event.

What it means for valueTwo years of record profit, then a 41% fall in EBITDA by FY30E that still leaves a 70% gross margin. In our base FY30E, Micron earns $124bn of NOPAT, against $86bn discounted by the price.

13. Forecasts (continued)

We are 3.0% below consensus on FY27 EPS and 3.6% above on FY28: the argument is timing

Our revenue is within 0.2% of consensus in FY27 and 7.6% above in FY28, and our operating income is within 0.4% of consensus — yet our FY27 EPS is 3.0% lower. The gap sits below EBIT: we model a 15.5% tax rate and FY27E net interest of $1.9bn, held at $475m a quarter while cash grows from $73bn to $208bn. Stock compensation is not the cause, because non-GAAP adds it back. The disagreement that matters is FY28.

Exhibit 52: Line by line against consensus: EBIT is within 0.4%, EPS is 3.0% lower
US$m unless statedPenmarkConsensusDiff.
FY27E
Revenue276,057275,510+0.2%
Operating income (EBIT)229,283230,300−0.4%
EPS, non-GAAP ($)171.21176.50−3.0%
FY28E
Revenue343,907319,680+7.6%
EPS, non-GAAP ($)215.36207.80+3.6%
FY29E EPS ($)197.83——

Source: Company filings; S&P Global consensus, 29 Oct 2026 (41 estimates for FY27E EPS; 10 for Q1 EPS); Penmark Research estimates.

Exhibit 53: Q1 FY27: our model sits inside every guided range
Q1 FY27EGuidanceModelConsensus
Revenue, $m60,000-63,00061,45061,830
Gross margin86.0-86.5%86.25%85.7%
Opex, $m2,000-2,1202,0602,040
EPS, non-GAAP ($)37.15-39.1537.7838.20
Diluted shares, m1,140-1,1601,1501,150
Tax rate15-16%15.5%15.0%
Capex, $m11,000-12,00011,50011,400

Source: Q4 FY26 call and guidance (30 Sep 2026); S&P Global consensus (29 Oct 2026); Yahoo Finance and Zacks for Q1 (14 and 28 Oct 2026); Penmark Research estimates.

Exhibit 54: In the base: $215 at risk if the bulls fail; not in the base: $152 lost if the bears land
SCA floor pathDRAM ASP FY28E +5%HBM pricing and marginServer unitsDC SSD shareNAND cleanroomsCXMT server DRAMNAND prices levelCost per bit slowerAI and HBM demand$134$38$18$17$8−$62−$29−$26−$21−$14

Source: Penmark Research model, Thesis tab. Value per share against the base case

Cash: $592bn by FY29E, and the model does not spend it. Free cash flow to the firm totals $499bn over FY27E-FY29E against $185bn of capex, taking cash and investments from $73.5bn to $592.4bn. We hold the share count at 1,150m; the model leaves out the $35.16bn authorization and treats it as value-neutral.

Balance sheet: net cash of $55.4bn after customer deposits. Debt stays near $5.2bn, interest income reaches $21.2bn by FY31E, and working capital absorbs $18.0bn in FY27E before releasing $2.5bn and $13.9bn in FY29E and FY30E as receivables shrink with revenue.

The sensitivities are asymmetric. The floor path, worth $134.44, is larger than any single bear item; the five bear items sum to −$151.91, and the bear case sits $404 below the base because the items compound.

14. Valuation

Two methods, 4.9% apart: $918 a share at the valuation date, $1,085 in twelve months

We value Micron on mid-cycle earnings because a single forecast year is meaningless when EPS ranges from $171 to $99 across four years. Averaging FY29E-FY36E NOPAT at a 6.9x multiple and adding the cash the company will hold gives $918.27; a full-cycle DCF gives $875.76.

Exhibit 55: Primary method: mid-cycle NOPAT at a justified multiple with 3% growth
Build, US$bn unless statedValue
Probability-weighted mid-cycle EBIT margin, FY29E-FY36E62.6%
Probability-weighted mid-cycle NOPAT143.3
Justified multiple on mid-cycle NOPAT6.90x
Value of operations at mid-cycle988.9
Discounted at the 15.3% WACC743.6
PV of FY27E-FY28E free cash flow257.0
Net cash after SCA deposits55.4
Diluted shares1,150m
Value per share at the 3 September 2026 valuation date$918.27
Rolled forward 14 months at the 15.4% cost of equity$1,085.40

Source: Penmark Research model. Mid-cycle is the weighted average of FY29E-FY36E; the justified multiple is (1 − g/RONIC) ÷ (WACC − g) = 6.90x.

Exhibit 56: Cross-check: a full-cycle DCF at a 15.3% WACC
DCF, FY27E-FY36EValue
Risk-free rate and equity risk premium4.9% / 4.23%
Beta, midpoint of own 2-year (2.66x) and peer median (2.30x)2.48x
Cost of equity15.39%
After-tax cost of debt, 0.7% weight4.7%
WACC15.32%
Terminal growth / return on new capital3.0% / 20%
Terminal value, share of enterprise value27.7%
Value per share$875.76
Gap to the primary method−4.9%

Source: Penmark Research model. Free cash flow to the firm FY27E-FY36E; terminal value on a RONIC-consistent fade.

Exhibit 57: Where the methods, the price and the target sit
US$ per shareDCFPrimaryWeightedPrice, 5 Nov 2026Target, 5 Nov 2027
Value875.76918.27918.27658.701,085.40
Return from the 5 Nov price+32.9%+39.4%+39.4%—+64.8%
Implied FY27E P/E5.1x5.4x5.4x3.8x6.3x

Source: Penmark Research model; exchanges. P/E on FY27E non-GAAP EPS of $171.21.

Why mid-cycle earnings, and why 6.9x. Our EPS falls 54% from FY28E to FY31E, so a forward multiple on any one year is a bet on cycle timing. Averaging eight years removes the timing call and leaves the franchise. With zero growth, a 15.3% cost of capital justifies 6.5x. We use 6.9x, which is (1 − 3%/20%) ÷ (15.32% − 3%): the growth that a 20% return on new capital supports, and nothing more.

Why the DCF corroborates rather than competes. The DCF uses the model's own cash flows to FY36E, a 3% terminal growth rate and a 20% return on new capital, and lands 4.9% below the primary method — inside the 15% tolerance, so the two methods agree on the answer. We would worry above a 75% terminal value share; it is 27.7%.

14. Valuation (continued)

Two of three cases clear the price; the bear is 23% below it

The scenarios are built from the drivers in section 9, not from a multiple range. Bear assumes the floor fails at CXMT's price and DRAM ASP falls 70% from the peak by FY31E; base assumes it holds, with a 62.3% trough gross margin and a 55% EBIT margin in FY31E; bull assumes DRAM stays tight into CY28 and the trough margin is 73.9%. The bear value of $507.25 is 23% below the current price, so the case for Buy rests on the 65% weight in base and bull, not on all three outcomes.

Exhibit 58: The price sits 28% below our base value and 30% above our bear case
Bear, 35%Base, 45%Bull, 20%Weighted$0$500$1000$1500$2000$507$911$1653$918

Source: Penmark Research model. Probability-weighted value; price at 5 November 2026

Exhibit 59: Of the $253 gap to the price, $252 is the trough-margin debate
$0$200$400$600$800$1000PriceFY27 exitCY28tightnessTroughdepthBase value+$659−$5+$6+$252$911

Source: Penmark Research model. Bridge from the share price to the base-case value, $ per share

ScenarioProb.FY27E EPSFY28E EPSTrough grossMid-cycle EBITValueReturn
Bear: floors fail, CXMT35%$152.15$158.4843.8%43.9%$507.25−23.0%
Base: floors hold45%$171.21$215.3662.3%62.0%$911.39+38.4%
Bull: CY28 tighter20%$181.63$241.9173.9%74.8%$1,653.04+151.0%
Probability-weighted100%————$918.27+39.4%

Source: Penmark Research model, Scenarios tab. Value at the 3 September 2026 valuation date; return to the 5 November 2026 price of $658.70, before the roll-forward. Trough is the lowest non-GAAP gross margin in FY29E-FY36E.

What the price implies. Reverse-engineering the model at $658.70 gives $86bn of mid-cycle NOPAT at the model multiple, a 37.5% EBIT margin on base-like revenue of $271bn. That cannot be set beside the bear's 43.9% on $165bn, so we compare NOPAT: the price ($86bn) sits between the bear ($61bn) and the base ($139bn), closer to the bear. The FY18 prior-cycle peak margin was 49.3%.

Why we weight the bear at 35%. Two of the five bear items are live today: CXMT is shipping 10% of DRAM and NAND cleanroom additions are scheduled for 2H CY28. The probability is a judgement, not a measurement; the Exhibit 15 grid shows value at other multiples and earnings levels.

Reconciliation to page 1. The $918.27 value at 3 September 2026 rolls forward 14 months at the 15.4% cost of equity, less dividends, to $1,085.40: the 12-month target, 64.8% above the price. With the 0.1% dividend yield the expected total return is 64.9%, above the +10% Buy threshold.

What would change the rating. Two things: a bear-case outcome, with the mid-cycle margin near 44%, if a CXMT price war overwhelms the contracts, or a share price above $987, where the expected return to target falls under 10%. Neither is our base case, and the second is 50% above today's price.

14. Valuation (continued)

The base value rests on FY29E-FY36E: 78% EBIT margin in FY29E, a 55% trough in FY31E, then 58-60%

The central judgement is how long the contracts last. If the agreements end in calendar 2030, they cover at most one quarter of the FY31E trough year and none of FY32E-FY36E. Our base holds FY32E-FY36E EBIT margin at 58-60% because price and cost per bit both fall about 6% a year.

Exhibit 60: Base EBIT margin falls from 78% in FY29E to a 55% trough in FY31E, then holds 58-60%
BullBaseBear20%40%60%80%FY27EFY29EFY31EFY33EFY35E

Source: Penmark Research model, Forecast tab (EBIT after stock compensation / revenue). Mid-cycle averages FY29E-FY36E: bear 43.9%, base 62.0%, bull 74.8%

Exhibit 61: Base NOPAT is $94bn at the FY31E trough and $139bn mid-cycle; the price discounts $86bn
BullBaseBear$0bn$100bn$200bn$300bn$400bnFY27EFY29EFY31EFY33EFY35EPrice-implied $86bn

Source: Penmark Research model, Forecast tab; NOPAT in $bn. Mid-cycle averages FY29E-FY36E: bear $61bn, base $139bn, bull $297bn

Exhibit 62: Base EBIT margin and NOPAT by year, FY27E-FY36E, against the bear and bull cases
FY to AugFY27EFY28EFY29EFY30EFY31EFY32EFY33EFY34EFY35EFY36E
Base case: floors hold
EBIT margin83.1%82.9%78.3%64.4%55.4%58.4%59.6%59.0%58.5%58.2%
NOPAT, $bn193.7241.0215.9123.693.9114.8129.9136.4143.5151.4
Bear case
EBIT margin81.5%78.2%62.4%33.6%32.7%41.0%44.2%43.7%43.3%42.8%
NOPAT, $bn171.8176.097.834.334.752.163.266.369.673.0
Bull case
EBIT margin84.1%84.7%84.2%78.9%73.0%74.7%74.6%73.0%71.8%70.9%
NOPAT, $bn205.7271.3315.5252.6219.4272.8309.5321.1334.7350.2

Source: Penmark Research model, Forecast tab. EBIT after stock compensation; NOPAT after tax. Mid-cycle is the FY29E-FY36E average: EBIT margin 43.9% bear, 62.0% base, 74.8% bull; NOPAT $61bn, $139bn, $297bn.

Four names for four margins. Price-implied: 37.5% EBIT, $86bn of NOPAT. Base mid-cycle, floors hold: 62.0%. Base trough, FY31E: 55% EBIT, 62.3% gross. Probability-weighted mid-cycle: 62.6%, valuation only, as it includes the bull case. In NOPAT the price sits between the bear ($61bn) and base ($139bn), closer to the bear.

What the contracts are. 26 supply agreements cover over 35% of revenue to 2030, with about 50% targeted. Remaining performance obligations are about $150bn at minimum prices and customer commitments $32bn. Customers have paid $12.7bn of cash deposits; the model deducts the $12.9bn contract liability in net cash.

What the base already contains. All five bull catalysts and none of the bear ones. From the base, $215 a share depends on the bulls landing and another $152 is at risk from the bears; the only upside is the bull case. The floor path alone is $134 a share, 53% of the gap between base value and the price.

Price your own view. Each 10% taken off mid-cycle earnings costs about $65 a share (Exhibit 15).

15. Catalysts

Four dated events can move the rating in the next twelve months, and three are print dates

The calendar is unusually dense because the contract book resets on a schedule. The Q1 FY27 print in December carries the first full quarter of 86% gross margin; the Q2 print in March is the first test of an SCA renewal; the Q4 print in September sets FY28 guidance against a supply timetable that does not loosen until late CY28.

Exhibit 63: The catalyst calendar: four of six events can move the rating
EventDatePenmark expectationConsensus or guideValue at stakeTest
Q1 FY27 results and 4Q26 contracts17 Dec 2026Revenue $61.5bn, margin 86.25%, EPS $37.78Guide $60-63bn; consensus $61.8bn, $38.20±4% on print, ±10% on guideYes
Q2 FY27 and first SCA renewal25 Mar 2027Coverage rises above 40% of revenueNo coverage estimate±$134 a share on the floor pathYes
Singapore HBM packaging output1Q CY27On schedule, HBM onlyManagement target±$8 a shareNo
Q3 FY27 and HBM4 second customer24 Jun 2027One additional qualified customerConsensus: two±$18 a shareNo
Q4 FY27, FY28 guide, CY28 contracts28 Sep 2027FY28 revenue $343.9bn, EPS $215.36Consensus $319.7bn, $207.80±$38 a share on FY28E DRAM ASPYes
ID1 and Tongluo cleanroomsMid CY27Tool move-in slips into CY28No consensus−$62 a share if pulled forwardYes

Source: Company filings; Q4 FY26 guidance and call (30 Sep 2026); S&P Global consensus (29 Oct 2026); Yahoo Finance and Zacks for Q1; Penmark Research estimates. Value at stake from the model's catalyst table (Exhibit 54): floor path $134, FY28E DRAM ASP $38, HBM $18, NAND cleanrooms −$62.

Exhibit 64: Four results prints and the target date fall inside twelve months; the March print is the first SCA test
Dec 2026Q1 FY27 results and 4Q26contractsMar 2027Q2 FY27: first SCArenewalJun 2027Q3 FY27: HBM4 secondcustomerSep 2027Q4 FY27: FY28 guide andCY28 contractsNov 2027Price target date

Source: Company filings; Q4 FY26 call (30 Sep 2026); Penmark Research. Expected reporting dates, not company-confirmed

The next number to watch for each driver. DRAM price: the 4Q26 settlement in December, guided +10-15% q/q by TrendForce, our base +12%. Gross margin: the Q1 FY27 print, guide 86.0-86.5%, consensus 85.7%. Capex: Q1 FY27 capex, guided $11-12bn, our model $11.5bn, with $55bn for FY27E. Contract floor: the first SCA renewal disclosed in March 2027.

What would change the rating. The call is robust to the discount rate: at +1pt the target is $1,024 and the return 55.5%; on the base case alone it is $1,077 and 63.6%. It would move to Hold only if the share price rose above $987, where the expected return to target falls below 10%, or if a contract signed below the floor moved weight to the $507 bear value.

16. Risks

The risk that matters is the floor, and the strongest evidence against us is the sell side's own optimism

Downside risks to a Buy rating, ranked by value at stake. The floor failing ends the thesis; the other risks shave value without changing the rating. All are measured against the base-case value of $911.39, and none is in the base.

RiskLikelihoodHow it reaches the modelValueFirst visible inEffect on base value
Floor fails: DRAM moves to the bear price pathMediumDRAM ASP follows the bear path (−70% to FY31E); the floor-path item is $134−$134Q2 FY27 renewal, Mar 2027Base value to $777
NAND cleanroom additions from 2H CY28MediumNAND ASP falls 20pp faster from FY29E−$61.62Supplier capex, 1H CY27Base value to $850
CXMT server DRAM at scaleMediumFY29E DRAM ASP −40% vs −20% in base−$29.34CXMT qualification, 1H CY27Base value to $882
NAND contract prices level from Q2 FY27MediumNAND ASP flat rather than +3% in FY27E−$26.06Q1 FY27 print, Dec 2026Base value to $885
Slower cost-per-bit declineMediumCost per bit −4% not −6% a year−$20.93FY27 gross margin walkBase value to $890
AI data-centre build slows, HBM despecMediumHBM bits per GPU cut; mix shifts to commodity−$13.96Hyperscaler capex, Jan 2027Base value to $897

Source: Penmark Research model, Thesis tab and bear case. Value per share against the $911.39 base; likelihood is the team's judgement, not a modelled probability.

What would end the thesis

An SCA renegotiated at spot prices. The entire bull case rests on the idea that a contract signed with cash on deposit survives a downturn; if the first renewal in March 2027 resets to market, the floor is a marketing document and the stock is a cyclical priced on a bear-like trough.

The strongest evidence against the call

The sell side is already bullish: 45 Buy, 3 Hold and 1 Sell, with an average target of $1,562 — 137% above the price. If a bull case this crowded exists, the argument that the market is missing the floor is weaker than it looks. Our answer is that consensus and our FY27E EPS ($176.50 against $171.21) agree; the disagreement is the depth of the FY29E-FY31E trough, where the price implies $86bn of mid-cycle NOPAT against $139bn in our base.

The precedent we cannot dismiss

Memory supply agreements have a history of being renegotiated when spot prices fall, and the FY23 loss of $5.8bn came with no contract book to cushion it. What is different this time is the cash: $12.7bn of deposits makes a customer's exit a balance-sheet decision, not a procurement one. If that distinction fails, it fails here.

Other risks

Key-person risk on Sanjay Mehrotra, who is chair and chief executive; Lynn Dugle is lead independent director. Construction delays at ID1, ID2 and New York would push out supply, which helps price but raises capex per wafer.

How we weight the risksThe five bear items total −$152 a share, but the bear case sits $404 below the base because the items share one driver, DRAM and NAND pricing, and compound. The bear case carries a 35% weight. The expected value of $918 still sits 39% above the price.

17. Ownership and trading

The Street is already long: 45 of 49 ratings are Buy, with an average target 44% above ours

Micron is a $745bn equity and a sell side 45 to 1 positive. The ownership risk is not a squeeze; it is that a bullish consensus leaves little room for a miss.

Exhibit 65: The Street average target of $1,562 is 44% above ours of $1,085
Price, 5 Nov $659Street average $1,562Penmark target $1,085

Source: S&P Global, October 2026; Penmark Research estimates

Exhibit 66: 45 Buy, 3 Hold, 1 Sell: the Street is already bullish on 2027
BuyHoldSell4531

Source: S&P Global; broker ratings and targets, October 2026

Trading and ownershipValueRead
Market capitalisation$745.0bn1,131m shares at $658.70
Consensus FY27E / FY28E EPS$176.50 / $207.80Penmark $171.21 / $215.36
Street ratings45 Buy, 3 Hold, 1 SellAverage target $1,562, 137% above the price
Index membershipS&P 500, Nasdaq-100, SOX0.1% dividend yield

Source: Exchanges; S&P Global (29 Oct 2026); Penmark Research. Market capitalisation at the 5 November 2026 close.

Exhibit 67: Penmark is 3.0% below consensus on FY27E EPS and 3.6% above on FY28E
Penmark non-GAAP EPS, $Consensus$0$50$100$150$200$250FY26AFY27EFY28EActualEstimates →$76$171$215

Source: Company filings (A); Penmark Research estimates (E); S&P Global consensus, 29 Oct 2026 (41 estimates for FY27E EPS)

Insider activity, last two filings

DateInsiderTransactionValue
16 Oct 2026S. DeBoer, CTOSale of 28,444 shares at $900$25.6m
16 Oct 2026S. DeBoer, CTOHoldings after the sale147,430 shares

Source: Form 4 filed 20 October 2026; Signals. The sale was made under a pre-arranged 10b5-1 plan.

The insider signal is neutral. A 10b5-1 sale of 16% of a holding at $900, 37% above today's price, is scheduled diversification. No executive has bought in the open market in twelve months, which is the more telling absence.

The crowding risk is not in the short interest. With 45 of 49 analysts positive, the marginal buyer is convinced. Our target is 31% below the Street's average because we value mid-cycle earnings at 6.9x, not FY27E earnings at a peer multiple.

18. Financial model | Appendix A

Five reported years that bracket the cycle, and five forecasts that repeat it

The reported record shows what the franchise looks like at both ends: a $5.8bn loss in FY23 and $85.0bn of net income three years later. The forecasts apply the same price mechanism with the contract book in place.

Exhibit 68: Income statement, reported: revenue grew 4.3x in four years and net income swung from −$5.8bn to $85.0bn
US$m unless statedFY22AFY23AFY24AFY25AFY26A
Revenue
DRAM22,38610,97817,60328,578100,679
NAND7,8114,2067,2278,50331,785
Other561356281297724
Revenue30,75815,54025,11137,378133,188
Growth+11%−49%+62%+49%+256%
Costs
Cost of goods sold16,86016,95619,49822,50525,684
Gross profit13,898−1,4165,61314,873107,504
Gross margin45.2%−9.1%22.4%39.8%80.7%
Research and development3,1163,1143,4303,7985,650
Selling, general and administration1,0669201,1291,2051,947
Other operating income and expense14295−250100567
Profit
Operating income9,702−5,7451,3049,77099,340
Operating margin31.5%−37.0%5.2%26.1%74.6%
Depreciation and amortisation7,1167,7567,7808,3529,503
EBITDA16,8182,0119,08418,122108,843
Net income8,687−5,8337788,53984,969
Per share
Diluted shares, m1,1221,0931,1181,1251,143
Diluted EPS, GAAP$7.75−$5.34$0.70$7.59$74.33
Diluted EPS, non-GAAP———$8.29$75.52

Source: SEC filings via Signals; Q4 FY26 results release (30 Sep 2026). GAAP unless marked. Non-GAAP EPS not shown for FY22-FY24.

Exhibit 69: Income statement, base case: profit peaks in FY28E and halves by FY31E
US$m unless statedFY26AFY27EFY28EFY29EFY30EFY31E
DRAM revenue100,679205,496258,925244,425168,653145,463
NAND revenue31,78569,02783,37180,03656,66653,493
Revenue133,188276,057343,907326,153227,095200,821
Gross profit, non-GAAP108,015240,445297,232268,121159,622125,137
Gross margin81.1%87.1%86.4%82.2%70.3%62.3%
Operating expense, non-GAAP6,8419,34110,08810,59311,12211,678
Operating income, non-GAAP101,174231,104287,144257,528148,500113,458
Stock-based compensation1,3331,8211,9672,0662,1692,277
Net interest income2311,8985,94411,70517,46821,200
Income tax14,76135,83345,12441,41125,38920,519
Net income84,969195,348245,997225,757138,410111,862
Depreciation and amortisation9,50311,39619,24527,48134,23439,517
EBITDA109,344240,679304,421282,943180,565150,698
Diluted EPS, GAAP$74.33$169.87$213.91$196.31$120.36$97.27
Diluted EPS, non-GAAP$75.52$171.21$215.36$197.83$121.95$98.94

Source: Penmark Research model, Statements tab. 1,150m diluted shares in all forecast years; no buyback assumed.

18. Financial model | Appendix B

Cash flow turns $190bn a year by FY27E, and the balance sheet carries no net debt

Free cash flow is $135.6bn in FY27E and $499bn over three years, against $5.2bn of debt. The FY26 balance sheet below is as reported.

Exhibit 70: Cash flow: capex doubles in FY27E but free cash flow still reaches $135.6bn
US$mFY24AFY25AFY26AFY27EFY28EFY29EFY30E
Net income7788,53984,969195,348245,997225,757138,410
Depreciation and amortisation7,7808,3529,50311,39619,24527,48134,234
Stock-based compensation8339721,3331,8211,9672,0662,169
Change in working capital−884−338−6,130−18,003−9,4992,48613,868
Cash from operations8,50717,52589,675190,562257,710257,788188,681
Capital expenditure8,38613,80427,36755,00065,00065,00063,587
Free cash flow1213,72162,308135,562192,710192,788125,095
Free cash flow margin0.5%10.0%46.8%49.1%56.0%59.1%55.1%
Dividends513522610690690690690
Share repurchases3000650————
Change in cash and investments−7682,60561,517134,872192,020192,098124,405
Cash and investments, closing9,33111,93673,453208,325400,345592,443716,848

Source: SEC filings via Signals (A); Q4 FY26 results release for the adjusted capex and free cash flow basis (A); Penmark Research model (E). FY27E onwards excludes buybacks.

Exhibit 71: Balance sheet at FY26A: $73.5bn of cash against $5.2bn of debt
Assets, US$mFY26AFY25ALiabilities and equity, US$mFY26AFY25A
Cash and equivalents38,3649,642Accounts payable22,6059,649
Short-term investments5,070665Current debt491560
Receivables36,1979,265Other current liabilities4,3861,245
Inventories10,3728,355Long-term debt4,68814,017
Other current assets1,067914Customer contract liabilities12,895142
Long-term investments30,0191,629Unearned government incentives7861,018
Property, plant and equipment, net63,31046,590Other noncurrent liabilities11,6592,002
Goodwill1,1501,150Total liabilities57,51028,633
Other noncurrent assets10,3394,588Total equity138,37854,165
Total assets195,88882,798Total liabilities and equity195,88882,798

Source: 10-K FY26 (filed 9 October 2026); 10-K FY25. Reported basis; the forecast model presents net operating working capital and a simplified liability structure.

What it means for valueThe cash balance does most of the work in the bridge: $73.5bn today, $592bn by FY29E, of which $55.4bn is net of customer deposits. Our valuation credits the current net cash ($48.16 a share, net of customer deposits) and the FY27E-FY28E free cash flow, and leaves the rest inside the operating value, which is why the model does not double-count the cash pile the forecasts generate.

18. Financial model | Appendix C

The quarterly build: revenue and EPS both grow every quarter of FY27E

The quarterly path is where the forecast is tested. Revenue rises 5-13% a quarter through FY27E, gross margin plateaus at 87.5%, and EPS rises from $37.78 in Q1 to $47.12 in Q4 FY27E as operating expense holds at $2.4bn a quarter.

Exhibit 72: Quarterly model: eight reported quarters and four forecast quarters
US$m unless statedQ1 FY26AQ2 FY26AQ3 FY26AQ4 FY26AQ1 FY27EQ2 FY27EQ3 FY27EQ4 FY27E
DRAM revenue10,81218,76831,32839,77144,98950,04653,60956,852
NAND revenue2,7434,9979,94314,10216,09516,90917,75418,269
Other revenue8895185356366377389401
Revenue13,64323,86041,45654,22961,45067,33271,75275,522
Growth, q/q+11%+75%+74%+31%+13.3%+9.6%+6.6%+5.3%
Gross margin, non-GAAP56.8%74.9%84.9%87.0%86.25%87.0%87.5%87.5%
Operating expense, non-GAAP1,3341,4211,5182,5682,0602,4272,4272,427
Operating income, non-GAAP6,17916,19533,64344,61150,94156,15260,35663,655
Operating margin45.3%67.9%81.2%82.3%82.9%83.4%84.1%84.3%
Capital expenditure2,4004,6007,90010,40011,50013,50014,50015,500
EPS, non-GAAP$4.78$12.20$25.11$33.42$37.78$41.61$44.70$47.12

Source: SEC filings via Signals and Q4 FY26 release (A); Penmark Research model (E). FY26 quarterly capex is per the 10-K; FY27E per the model's quarterly build.

Exhibit 73: Reconciliation of FY26A non-GAAP to reported earnings
FY26A, US$m unless statedValuePer share
Net income, GAAP84,969$74.33
Add back: stock-based compensation1,333$1.17
Tax effect of the adjustment at 15.5%−207−$0.18
Other non-GAAP items224$0.20
Net income, non-GAAP86,319$75.52
Diluted shares, m1,143
Quality of earnings
Non-GAAP as a share of GAAP net income101.6%—
Cash conversion, free cash flow to net income73.3%—
Stock-based compensation, share of revenue1.0%—
Depreciation, share of revenue7.1%—

Source: 10-K FY26; Q4 FY26 results release; Penmark Research. The gap between adjusted and reported earnings is 1.6% of net income.

What it means for valueAn adjusted-to-reported gap of 1.6% leaves little room for the accounting criticism that usually attaches to memory names: there are no capitalised development costs, no channel inventory to speak of and no reserve releases. The earnings are cash earnings, which is why we apply the 6.9x multiple without a quality discount.

19. Reference

Definitions, peer set and method: everything needed to rebuild the numbers

A quarterly build with an annual bridge to FY36E. Two definitions matter: enterprise value treats customer deposits as a liability, and net cash is stated after those deposits.

Glossary

SCA. Supply and capacity agreement: a multi-year contract with a floor price, a volume commitment and a customer cash deposit. Twenty-six are in force, covering more than 35% of revenue to 2030.

HBM. High-bandwidth memory: DRAM die stacked and packaged for AI accelerators. Micron held 18% of the market in Q3 CY26 against SK hynix's 50%.

Bit and ASP per bit. Industry volume is measured in bits; revenue is bits multiplied by the average price per bit. A 20% bit increase at a 6% cost-per-bit decline is the model's base productivity assumption.

RPO. Remaining performance obligations: contracted revenue not yet recognised, about $150bn at the minimum prices in the SCA book.

Ratio definitions

P/E. Share price divided by diluted non-GAAP EPS for the stated year. EV/EBITDA. Today's enterprise value of $689.6bn divided by each year's EBITDA. FCF. Cash from operations less net capital expenditure. Net cash. Cash and investments less total debt less customer deposits. ROCE. NOPAT divided by net debt plus equity. Mid-cycle EBIT margin. Average EBIT margin over FY29E-FY36E: 62.0% in the base, 62.6% probability-weighted.

Methodology note

Business model: products and units, price-led. Revenue is built as bits × ASP per bit for DRAM and NAND separately, with cash cost per bit declining 6% a year. There is no backlog-conversion model and no subscription metric; the KPI set is ASP, bit growth, cost per bit and contract coverage.

Valuation. Primary method is a justified multiple on mid-cycle NOPAT over FY29E-FY36E, cross-checked by a full-cycle DCF to FY36E. Peer multiples are shown for context only, because all four peers trade on near-peak earnings and a forward multiple therefore measures cycle position rather than value.

Definitions. EV includes the $12.9bn of customer deposits as a liability, so EV/EBITDA is not comparable with screens that ignore them. The buyback authorised on 9 December 2026 is not modelled and is treated as value-neutral.

Data sources and as-of dates

Price $658.70 at the close on 5 November 2026. Valuation date 3 September 2026; target date 5 November 2027. Consensus from S&P Global, 29 October 2026 (41 estimates for FY27E EPS; 10 for Q1 EPS); Yahoo Finance and Zacks for Q1 FY27. Company data from the FY26 10-K (filed 9 October 2026), the Q4 FY26 release and call (30 September 2026) and SEC filings via Signals. Industry data: TrendForce and BofA (October 2026). Market data: exchanges.

Exhibit 74: The peer set: five memory and storage names, and why each is in
CompanyModelWhy it is in the setDifference from MicronCovered?
Samsung ElectronicsMemory and devicesLargest DRAM and NAND supplier, 38% and 30%Captive demand; devices businessNo
SK hynixMemoryHBM leader at 50%; closest pure playHigher HBM mix, Korean cost baseNo
SanDiskNAND and SSDPure NAND; the NAND cycle readNo DRAM, no contract bookNo
SeagateHDDNearline storage substituteBenefits from NAND tightnessNo
Western DigitalHDDData-centre storage exposureNo DRAM; HDD pricing is set separatelyNo

Source: Company filings; TrendForce; BofA. Shares are Q2 CY26 for DRAM and NAND, Q3 CY26 for HBM.

How to rebuild the targetMid-cycle NOPAT of $143.3bn × 6.90x discounted two years at 15.32%, plus $257.0bn present value of FY27E-FY28E cash flow and $55.4bn of net cash, over 1,150m shares, gives $918.27; rolled forward 14 months at the 15.39% cost of equity, less dividends, $1,085.40.
PART 5 · APPENDIX · 21 DISCLOSURES

Analyst certification and important disclosures

Ratings

Ratings reflect the expected total return to our 12-month price target, including dividends, weighted across bull, base and bear scenarios.

BuyExpected total return above +10%
HoldExpected total return between −10% and +10%
SellExpected total return below −10%

We review ratings at each set of results and whenever the facts change materially. A share price can move outside its band before the rating changes, and targets may not be reached.

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The Penmark Team certifies that (1) the views in this report accurately reflect its views about the subject company and its securities, and (2) no part of its compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific ratings, price targets or views in this report.

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